Data privacy and security becomes a major concern in building machine learning models from different data providers. Federated learning shows promise by leaving data at providers locally and exchanging encrypted information. This paper studies the vertical federated learning structure for logistic regression where the data sets at two parties have the same sample IDs but own disjoint subsets of features. Existing frameworks adopt the first-order stochastic gradient descent algorithm, which requires large number of communication rounds. To address the communication challenge, we propose a quasi-Newton method based vertical federated learning framework for logistic regression under the additively homomorphic encryption scheme. Our approach can considerably reduce the number of communication rounds with a little additional communication cost per round. Numerical results demonstrate the advantages of our approach over the first-order method.
Introduction
With the surge of artificial intelligence (AI) driven services including recommender system and natural language processing, data privacy and security have raised worldwide concerns [1] . More and more stringent requirements of data privacy and security become an emerging trend of laws and regulations from states across the world. A known example is the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) by the European Union [2] . Traditional AI service providers usually collect and transfer data instances from one party to anther party. Then a machine learning model is trained at the cloud data center with the fused data set. However, it faces challenges of data breach and violation of data protection laws and regulations [3] .
Recently, federated learning [1, 4, 5] is an emerging frontier field studying privacy-preserving collaborative machine learning while leaving data instances at their providers locally. A line of works [4, 5, 6] focus on the horizontal structure, in which each node has a subset of data instances with complete data attributes. There are also many researches studying the vertical federated learning structure where the data set is vertically partitioned and owned by different data providers. That is, each data provider holds a disjoint subset of attributes for all data instances. The target is to learn a machine learning model collaboratively without transferring any data from one data provider to another. In particular, [7] proposes a privacy-preserving tree-boosting system SecureBoost and [8] propose a logistic regression framework for vertically partitioned data.
Problem Statement
Consider a typical logistic regression problem with vertically partitioned data [8] . Let X ∈ R n×T be the data set consisting of T data samples and each instance has n features. The class attribute information, i.e., the label of data, is given by y ∈ {−1, +1} T . The data set is vertically partitioned and distributed on two honest-but-curious private parties A (the host data provider with only features) and B (the guest data provider with features and labels). Let X A ∈ R n A ×T be the data set owned by party A and X B ∈ R n B ×T owned by party B. Each party owns a disjoint subset of data features over a common sample IDs with X = (X A , X B ). In addition, only party B has access to the labels y. The target of logistic regression is to train a linear model for classification by solving
where w is the model parameters, x i is the i-th data instance and y i is the corresponding label. The negative log-likelihood loss function is given by l(w; x i , y i ) = log(1 + exp(y i w T x i )). In this paper, we suppose that party A and party B hold the model parameters corresponding to their features respectively, which can be denoted as w = (w A , w B ) where w A ∈ R n A and w B ∈ R n B .
[8] proposes a stochastic gradient descent (SGD) based vertical logistic regression framework by computing gradients via exchanging encrypted intermediate values at each iteration. Specifically, party A and party B collaboratively compute the vertically partitioned encrypted gradient g A ∈ R n A and g B ∈ R n B , which can be decrypted by the third party. To achieve secure computation without transferring data from one party to another, the additively homomorphic encryption is adopted. Additively homomorphic encryption schemes such as Paillier [13] allow any party can encrypt their data with a public key, while the private key for decryption is owned by the third party, i.e., the coordinator. With additively homomorphic encryption we can compute the additive of two encrypted numbers as well as the product of an unencrypted number and an encrypted one, which can be denoted as u + v = u + v , v · u = vu by using · as the encryption operation. Unfortunately, the loss function and its gradient cannot be computed directly with additively homomorphic encryption.
To address this issue, we will adopt the Taylor approximation for the loss function is proposed in [8, 14] as
A Quasi-Newton Method Based Vertical Federated Learning Framework
In federated learning, the communication cost between different parties is much more expensive than it in the cloud computing center since the data providers are usually across distant data centers, across different networks, or even in a wireless environment with limited bandwidth [5] . So it becomes one of the main bottlenecks for efficiently model training. For this reason, we develop a communication efficient vertical federated learning framework by incorporating second-order information [11] to reduce the communication rounds between parties, which is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
The gradient and the Hessian of the Taylor loss in equation (2) with respect to the i-th data instance are respectively given by ∇l(w;
In the k-th iteration, classical L-BFGS algorithm uses the history information in last M iterations by differencing gradient and model parameters between every two consecutive iterations to obtain an estimated inverse Hessian matrix H ∈ R n×n . But it will lead to a unstable curvature estimation if we use mini-batch data instead of full data. To obtain a stable estimation of H, we shall use the sub-sampled Hessian information as suggested by [11] . Moreover, the curvature information H can be updated every L iterations to reduce the communication overhead as well as improve the stability of quasi-Newton algorithm. The details of computing the key ingredients for our system are introduced in the following part.
Computing Loss and Gradient at Party A&B Let S ⊆ {1, · · · , T } be the index set of the chosen mini-batch data instances. The corresponding loss and gradient are given by loss = F (w) =
i ∈ S} for party A (similarly u B and u 2 B for party B) and d = {d i : i ∈ S}, the encrypted loss and gradient can be computed by transmitting u A from party A to party B, and transmitting d from B to A following
Computing Updates for Estimating Curvature Information at Party A&B To achieve cheap communication costs introduced additionally, the curvature information H is updated every L iterations at the coordinator by collecting encrypted v = (v A , v B ) ∈ R n from party A and B. Specifically, every L iterations we shall compute the difference of average model parameters as
at party A and party B. Then the product of sub-sampled Hessian ∇ 2F (w t ) and average model difference s t are given by
The sub-sampled Hessian is calculated with respect to a randomly chosen subset of data S H . Under additively homomorphic encryption, v t can be computed following
where Computing Descent Direction at the Coordinator After collecting the encrypted loss loss , gradient g , and v from party A&B, the coordinator should determine a descent directiong for updating w A and w B , i.e., w ← w −g = (w A −g A , w B −g B ). Given an estimated H, the descent direction is given byg = ηHg where η > 0 is the learning rate. Every L iterations, v and s are stored in two queues with length M . H is determined by successively computing
It should be noted that s t can be computed locally at the coordinator as s t = k i=k−L+1g i /L − k−L i=k−2L+1g i /L without any additional transmissions. The overall quasi-Newton method based vertical federated learning framework is illustrated in Fig. 1 . The source code will be released in an upcoming version of the FATE framework [15] .
At each iteration, the communication costs of SGD are 3|S| encrypted numbers between party A and party B, and 2n encrypted numbers between party A&B and the coordinator. With our quasi-Newton framework, the communication costs become 3|S| + 2|S H |/L encrypted numbers between party A and party B, and (2 + 1/L)n encrypted numbers between party A&B and the coordinator. By choosing |S H | ≤ |S|, the presented quasi-Newton method introduces no more than 1/L additional communication costs at per communication round compared with [8] . 
Experiments and Conclusion
We conduct numerical experiments on two credit scoring data sets to test the advantages of our system over the mini-batch SGD method based system in [8] . Credit 1 [16] : It consists of 30000 data instances and each instance has n = 25 attributes; 2) Credit 2 [17] : It contains 150000 data instances and each with 10 attributes. By splitting each data set into two parts vertically, each party holds a subset of features and party B also holds the labels. We randomly choose 80% data instances as the training set and the remaining 20% as the test set. We choose S H = S and L = 4 in all simulations and each algorithm stops when the loss between two consecutive epochs is less than 10 −5 . The number of epochs, the training loss and the area under the curve (AUC) of the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve on the test set are shown in table 1. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed system requires less communication overhead than the first-order SGD based framework. In this paper, we consider the communication challenges in vertical federated learning problem with two data providers for learning a logistic regression model collaboratively. We propose to use a quasi-Newton method to reduce the number of communication rounds. With the additively homomorphic encryption scheme, two data providers compute an encrypted gradient by exchanging encrypted intermediate values, and an additional vector every L iterations for updating the curvature information. Numerical experiment demonstrate that our method considerably reduces the number of communication rounds with a little additional communication cost per round.
